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The paper represents a systematical critique of Wittgenstein’s attitude to semantics of the natural 
language of ethics and metaphysics. The critique is implemented by means of a discrete mathematical 
simulation of the famous principle of separation of facts and values. For precise mathematical 
formulating this separation principle a two-valued algebra of formal ethics is exploited. Being 
equipped with the fact-&-value-separation principle the author submits systematical separating two 
worlds, two opposite aspects of natural languages, two formal semantics, two kinds of meanings, 
two different principles of linguistic compositionality of meanings, and two kinds of nonsenses. The 
twin worlds, twin aspects of natural languages, twin formal semantics, twin kinds of meanings and 
twin kinds of nonsenses are inter-excluding and inter-complementing ones. The first elements of the 
twins are related to the world of “Tractatus”. The second elements of the twins are related to the 
world of pure values which world is transcendent to the one of “Tractatus”. The paper is targeted 
at explicating and precise tabular defining formal-axiological meanings of words and compound 
word-combinations of the natural language of morals and metaphysics. The author proclaims that 
according to the submitted (novel) formal-axiological principle of linguistic compositionality (of 
meanings), formal-axiological meaning of a compound word-combination (of the natural language 
of morals and metaphysics) is a composition of such moral-evaluation-functions which are formal-
axiological meanings of the parts of the compound word-combination. The idea of computing 
formal-axiological meanings of compound word-combinations (of the language of morals and 
metaphysics) is exemplified by the submitted discourse about proper knowledge, alethic faith, and 
alethic tolerance. In the algebraic system of formal ethics a precise definition of the formal-ethical-
equivalence relation among moral-evaluation-functions is given and formal-ethical equations 
are generated by means of computing relevant moral-evaluation-tables. Equations linking moral-
evaluation-functions “knowledge”, “assumption”, “ faith”, “doubt” are used as representative 
examples.
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The title of this paper is to irritate those who 
are funs of Ludwig Wittgenstein and know his 
biography and writings very well. Why? First of 
all it is so because Wittgenstein used to write and 
speak about: the world but not (two) worlds; the 
language but not (two) languages; the nonsense 
but not (two) kinds of nonsenses. Hence this 
paper is devoted not to creating a precise realistic 
picture of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as such but 
to criticizing his worldview by means of discrete 
mathematical modeling a formal-ethical aspect 
of it. According to logic, methodology, and 
philosophy of science, it is normal that model and 
original do not coincide: they must be similar but 
not completely identical; otherwise model has 
no heuristic value. Obviously Wittgenstein did 
not undertake discrete mathematical modeling 
a formal-ethical aspect of his worldview. He did 
not undertake a formal-ethical investigation as 
well. Sometimes he spoke and wrote of ethics 
but not of formal one. Moreover he summoned 
and tried to avoid explicitly talking of (positive) 
ethics: his talks (and even the lecture) of ethics 
were negative: positive talking of ethics (and of 
metaphysics) was labeled as meaningless. One 
can paradoxically characterize his “Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus” as a treatise about ethics 
but the “Tractatus” defines ethics only negatively 
and implicitly: it does not contain manifestly 
defining and substantiating positive moral values. 
Wittgenstein believed that positive moral values 
are to be shown in human conduct instead of 
being spoken about (as speaking of positive 
moral values has no meaning). According to 
Wittgenstein’s biography he had shown his 
positive moral values in his moral and religious 
behavior. Nevertheless below I undertake 
investigating possibility of manifest (explicit) 
formulating quite a positive ethical system (a 
formal-ethical one) of moral evaluations in spite 
of the well-established and recognized fact of 
flexibility and relativity of moral assessments of 
elementary moral actions. That is why funs and 
connoisseurs of Wittgenstein shall be irritated 
by the below presented formal-ethical discourse. 
Notwithstanding this expectation I believe that 
the below submitted discourse is worth taking 
seriously and discussing systematically. 
 In times of Wittgenstein the descriptive-
indicative meanings of empirical sentences and 
the formal-logical semantics of the language 
of science were investigated carefully. On the 
contrary, the possibility of construction and 
systematical application of a formal-axiological 
semantics of evaluative sentences (of ethics, 
aesthetics, religion, metaphysics, etc.) was not 
recognized. (I think that it is not recognized 
properly even today.) Investigating the evaluative 
(formal-axiological) semantics of the natural 
language was underestimated and even ignored. 
Probably at the level of sub-consciousness 
Wittgenstein perceived this asymmetry situation 
and therefore instinctively tried to correct it by 
attracting attention to semantics of the natural 
language which combined both aspects: the 
factual (formal-logical) and the evaluative 
(formal-axiological) ones. 
According to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, the 
world is a totality of facts [22]. Let the symbol 
W1 stand for this world. Values do not exist in the 
world W1. Hence even “truth-values” belong not to 
the world of facts but to the one of values: “Logic 
is transcendental” [22]. Ethics, aesthetics and 
other axiological disciplines are transcendental 
as well [22]. That language which is isomorphic 
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to the world of “Tractatus” (let that language be 
called L1) must be not used in any talks about pure 
values: otherwise the talks become meaningless. 
Using the language L1 one must abstain from 
saying something about values. Otherwise using 
the language L1 heads to nonsenses. 
Nevertheless, as strange as it is, Wittgenstein 
himself was not perfectly silent with respect 
to values; he did not absolutely abstain from 
discussing them at the level of natural language. 
Many facts of his private life [23], philosophical 
texts, and confessions of the people with whom he 
communicated demonstrate that he shared quite 
definite religious and moral values and norms, 
attempted to follow them systematically in his 
life [3; 4; 7; 10; 15; 22—27]. Thus he really lived 
in the world of values or at its border-line (let the 
world of values be called W2). By definition, the 
world W2 is a totality of values (and only values). 
Facts do not belong to W2. The two worlds W1 
and W2 exclude and complement each other. 
Their union makes up the universe of discourse 
accomplished by means of the natural language. 
That language (L1), which is isomorphic to the 
world of “Tractatus”, is an important subsystem 
of the natural language as a system. Another 
important subsystem of the natural language 
system is such a language (let it be called L2), 
which is isomorphic to the world of pure values 
(W2). L2 must be not used in any talks about pure 
facts: otherwise the talks become meaningless. 
Using only the language L2 one must abstain from 
saying something about facts as such. Otherwise 
the usage of L2 heads to nonsenses. 
There are two different kinds of nonsenses. 
One kind of them (let us call it N1) is a result of 
using L1 for talking about W2. Another kind of 
nonsenses (let us call it N2) is a result of using 
L2 for talking about W1. The relationship < W1, 
L1> makes up the descriptive-indicative (formal-
logical) semantics to be called S1. The relationship 
< W2, L2> makes up the evaluative (formal-
axiological) semantics to be called S2. As the first 
is well-studied and the second is almost unknown, 
hereafter we shall discuss systematically the 
formal-axiological semantics dealing with 
formal-axiological meanings (let M2 stand for 
these meanings) of words and word-combinations 
of the natural language. (Let, respectively, M1 
stand for the descriptive-indicative meanings of 
the natural one.) 
The present paper is aimed at explicating 
universal and immutable laws of the world of 
pure values. However many humans believe that 
universal and immutable laws of the world of pure 
values do not exist. The overwhelming majority 
believes that being of such formal-axiological 
laws is impossible as values and assessments 
are necessarily relative and undergo permanent 
change. 
Many humans believe that any relativism 
is incompatible with objective knowledge. In 
particular, they think that if moral evaluations of 
concrete contents of moral actions (and agents) are 
relative to evaluators, then objective moral laws 
(=necessarily universal and immutable positive-
moral-evaluations of actions) do not exist as they 
are impossible on principle. However, in my 
opinion, objective knowledge is compatible with 
some forms of relativism [13]. For instance, it is 
compatible with a relative relativism, i.e. such 
relativism, which is not an absolute one. 
This general statement may be exemplified 
by the relativistic physics. In the special-relativity-
theory it is demonstrated that (if x is a physical 
body then) mass of x, length of x, time of x are 
necessarily relative: they necessarily depend upon 
that physical systems, in relation to which they 
are measured; measuring in relation to different 
systems gives different results. Nevertheless there 
are some physical qualities, which invariantly 
exist in relation to all physical systems. These 
invariant physical qualities are considered as 
objective laws of the special-relativity-theory. 
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Thus physics has made a precedent to be applied 
to analogous cases. The situation in relativistic 
ethics is analogous to the one in relativistic 
physics. Therefore the experience of creating 
relativistic physics is heuristically important for 
creating relativistic ethics as a system of objective 
knowledge of absolute laws of the moral-value-
relativity [11; 13]. 
The special-relativity-theory was precisely 
formulated and developed by means of the 
mathematical language. It was impossible to 
create and develop this theory by means of the 
natural language. In formal ethics the situation is 
analogous to the one in physics. It is impossible to 
create and develop a theory of relativity of moral 
evaluations (as a system of absolute laws of their 
relativity) at the level of natural language. For 
departing from the old-fashioned absolute-moral-
relativism to precise mathematical formulations 
of absolute formal-ethical laws of moral-
evaluation-relativity [11; 13], it is necessary to 
construct an artificial language of formal ethics 
for investigating a mathematical model of the 
system of moral evaluations of actions and agents. 
Hereafter let us start constructing the artificial 
language and the mathematical model. 
Below the possibility of mathematical 
representation of moral activity is demonstrated by 
the elementary mathematical ethics — two-valued 
algebra of good and evil [11; 13]. This algebra is 
based upon the set of acts. By definition, acts 
are such and only such operations which are 
either-good-or-bad ones in the moral meaning of 
the words “good” and “bad”. Algebraic operations 
defined on the set of acts are moral-evaluation-
functions. Moral-evaluation-variables of these 
functions take their values from the set {g, b}. 
Here the symbols “g” and “b” stand for the moral 
values of acts “good” and “bad” respectively. The 
functions take their values from the same set. 
The symbols: “x” and “у” stand for moral-forms 
of acts. Elementary moral-act-forms deprived of 
their contents are independent moral-evaluation-
variables. Compound moral-act-forms deprived 
of their contents are moral-evaluation-functions 
determined by these variables. 
Let symbol Σ stand for the moral evaluator, 
i.e. that person, in relation to which all evaluations 
are generated. In the moral-evaluation-relativity 
theory, Σ is a variable: changing values of the 
variable Σ can result in changing moral evaluations 
of concrete acts and agents. However if a value of 
the variable Σ is fixed, then moral evaluations of 
concrete acts and agents are definite. 
DEFINITION DF-1 (of invariant law of 
moral-relativity theory): in two-valued algebra of 
formal ethics, a moral-evaluation-function is 
called formally-ethically (or invariantly) good 
one, if and only if it acquires the moral value 
g (good) under any possible combination of 
moral values of its variables. 
DEFINITION DF-2 (of formal-ethical 
contradiction): in two-valued algebra of formal 
ethics, a moral-evaluation-function is called 
formally-ethically (or invariantly) bad one, if 
and only if it acquires the moral value b (bad) 
under any possible combination of moral values 
of its variables. 
DEFINITION DF-3 (of formal-ethical-
equivalence-relation): in two-valued algebra 
of formal ethics, moral-evaluation-functions x 
and у are formally-ethically equivalent (this 
is represented by the symbol “x=+=y”), 
if and only if they acquire identical moral 
values (from the set {g, b}) under any possible 
combination of moral values of the variables. 
In the natural language the equivalence 
relation “x=+=y” is represented by the 
ambiguous word-homonym “is” [11; 12]. Its 
ambiguity and homonymy was noticed and 
recognized by many prominent logicians 
and philosophers including Wittgenstein [22, 
p. 55]. For adequate understanding the present 
paper here it is worthy of note that “is” as the 
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well-known logical connective, and “is” as a 
linguistic means for representing the relation 
“x=+=y” in the natural language, are not 
synonyms. Hence substituting them for each 
other is strictly forbidden [12].Violating this 
prohibition produces linguistic illusions of 
logic contradictions with facts. 
Taking into an account the above-given 
definitions, one can make an important 
discovery: the invariant laws of moral-relativity 
theory do not depend upon possible changes of 
the moral evaluator Σ. If x is a formal-ethical law, 
then x is morally good in relation to every moral 
evaluator Σ. 
Moreover, in the moral-relativity theory 
under review, formal-ethical contradictions of 
complex moral conduct also do not depend upon 
possible changes of the moral evaluator Σ. If x is a 
formal-ethical contradiction, then x is morally bad 
in relation to every moral evaluator Σ. 
Finally, if there is the above-defined formal-
ethical equivalence-relation between moral-
evaluation-functions x and у, then the functions 
x and у are formally-ethically equivalent ones 
in relation to every moral evaluator Σ. 
Hence, in spite of the flexibility and relativity 
of elementary moral evaluations, there are 
absolute invariants (immutable universal laws) 
of the moral relativity [11; 13]. Thus the moral 
relativity is not absolute but relative one. 
To exemplify the above-said let us discuss 
moral-evaluation-functions “proper knowledge (or 
knowledge proper)”, “alethic (true) faith”, “doubt”, 
“assumption”, “toleration” and “tolerance” in 
two-valued algebraic system of formal ethics. To 
begin discussing these functions let us introduce 
the symbols standing for them in the artificial 
language of this algebra and then precisely define 
formal-axiological meanings of the introduced 
symbols by means of corresponding tables. 
The glossary for the Table 1: The symbol 
KExy stands for the moral-evaluation-function “x’s 
knowing (what, whom) y (in the proper episteme 
meaning of ‘knowing’)”. ADxy – the evaluation-
function “x’s assuming y (as a proper episteme)”. 
IDxy – “x’s not-assuming y (as a proper episteme)”. 
NExy – “x’s not-knowing (what, whom) y. DXxy – 
“y’s being a doxa of (for) x”. DMxy – “y’s having 
a determined epistemic quality for x”. The moral-
evaluation-functional sense of these operations is 
defined by the Table 1. 
The glossary for the Table 2: The symbol FAxy 
stands for moral-evaluation-function “x’s alethic 
(true) faith (not-revisable belief) in (what, whom) 
y”. DNxy – “x’s alethic doubt (not-removable one) 
in not-y”. FNxy – “x’s true faith (not-revisable 
belief) in not-y”. DTxy – “x’s alethic doubt (not-
removable one) in y”. SCxy – “x’s alethic (true) 
skepticism concerning y, i.e. x’s alethic doubt 
in both: y and not-y”. NSxy – “nonbeing of x’s 
alethic skepticism concerning y”, i.e. “either x’s 
alethic faith in y”, or “x’s alethic faith in not-y”. 
The moral-evaluation-functional sense of these 
operations is defined by the Table 2. 
The glossary for the Table 3: The symbol 
NNxy stands for “x’s alethic (true) non-toleration of 
Table 1: “Proper episteme” and “assumption” 
x y KExy ADxy IDxy NExy DXxy DMxy
g g b g b g g b
g b b g b g g b
b g g g b b b g
b b b b g g b g
Table 2: “Alethic faith” and “alethic doubt”
x y FAxy DNxy FNxy DTxy SCxy NSxy
g g b g b g g b
g b b g b g g b
b g g g b b b g
b b b b g g b g
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“knowledge” and “faith”, hence, they could 
estimate 1)-6) as paradoxes. However there 
are only illusions of paradoxes caused by the 
ambiguity of the natural language. For destroying 
such illusions of paradoxes in algebra of formal 
ethics there is a formal principle of autonomy of 
facts and values, which is precisely formulated 
as follows. 
Let ßx stand for an act of informing (true 
or false affirming) that x takes place in reality. 
Concerning the relationship between “=+=” and 
“logic equivalence”, the principle in question may 
be formulated as the following rule (A&B): 
(А) From the truth of x=+=y it does not 
follow logically that logic equivalence of ßx and 
ßy is true; 
(В) From the truth of logic equivalence of 
ßx and ßy it does not follow logically that x=+=y 
is true. 
The illusion of paradox concerning 
equations 1)-6) is destroyed by (A&B). This 
illusion is a result of not-recognized “jumps” 
from formal-ethical equivalences of evaluations 
to formal-logical equivalences of facts (and back 
from the formal-logical equivalences of facts to 
the formal-ethical equivalences of evaluations). 
In algebra of formal ethics such bridging the gap 
between facts and values is strictly forbidden 
by (A&B), which is an explication of important 
particular case of the general principle of mutual 
formal-logic autonomy of corresponding facts 
and values (propositions and evaluations). The 
rule (A&B) can be universalized in the following 
way. Let us call this generalization “(Y&Z)”; 
(Y) From x=+=y it does not logically follow 
that (ßxßy); 
(Z) From (ßxßy) it does not logically follow 
that x=+=y. 
 Here the symbol “” stands for any element 
of the set of all binary formal logic operations. 
As to the unary operations of algebra of 
formal ethics, the general value-&-fact-autonomy 
Table 3: “Toleration” and “alethic tolerance”
x y NNxy TOxy NOxy TNxy TCxy NTxy
g g b g b g g b
g b b g b g g b
b g g g b b b g
b b b b g g b g
not-y”, or “x’s not-standing (what, whom) not-y”. 
TOxy – “x’s alethic toleration of y”, or “x’s standing 
y”. NOxy – “x’s alethic non-toleration of y”. TNxy – 
“x’s alethic toleration of not-y”. TCxy – “x’s alethic 
tolerance to y, i.e. x’s standing both: y and not-y”. 
NTxy –“nonbeing of x’s alethic tolerance to y”, 
i.e. “either x’s alethic non-toleration of y”, or “x’s 
alethic non-toleration of not-y”. These operations 
are defined by the Table 3. 
Using the above-given definitions one can 
demonstrate the following equations. 
1) KExy=+=BFxy: proper knowledge is 
alethic faith.
2) BFxy=+=KExy: alethic faith is proper 
knowledge. 
3) AExy=+=DNxy: assuming means 
doubting-in-the-contrary.
4) NAxy=+=BNxy: not-assuming is alethic 
faith-in-the-contrary. 
5) NKxy=+=DTxy: non-being of proper 
knowledge means doubt, i.e. non-being of 
alethic faith. 
6) DExy=+=SCxy: proper knowledge-
indifference is equivalent to alethic faith-
indifference.
7) RExy=+=BPxy: non-being of proper 
knowledge-indifference is equivalent to 
non-being of alethic faith-indifference. 
According to these equations, the knowledge-
modalities and the corresponding faith-ones are 
formally-ethically equivalent to each other. This 
outcome of mathematical modeling is surprising 
for those who are used to the opposition of 
– 907 –
Vladimir Lobovikov. Two Worlds, Two Languages, Two Semantics, Two Linguistic Principles of Compositionality…
principle can be precisely formulated as the 
following rule (U&Q): 
U) From ß@x it does not logically follow 
that ßx; 
Q) From ßx it does not logically follow that 
ß@x; 
Here the symbol “@” stands for any element 
of the set of all unary operations of algebra of 
formal ethics [11; 13; 14]. 
Now taking into an account the above-said 
let us consider the famous linguistic principle 
of semantic compositionality of meanings 
of compound word-combinations [9; 16-21]. 
According to this compositionality principle, 
the semantic meaning of a complex phrase is a 
function determined by meanings of parts of the 
complex phrase. If parts of the complex phrase 
are functions determined by meanings of their 
parts, then the semantic meaning of the complex 
phrase under consideration is a composition of 
the functions. Here the terms “function” and 
“composition of functions” are used in their 
proper mathematical meanings. 
According to algebra of metaphysics 
considered as algebra of formal axiology 
[11], in particular, as algebra of formal ethics 
[13], semantic meanings of words and word-
combinations in the natural language of ethics and 
metaphysics are nothing but moral-evaluation-
functions determined by a finite number of moral-
evaluation-variables [11-14]. Semantic meanings 
of compound word-combinations in the natural 
language of ethics and metaphysics are nothing 
but compositions of the moral-evaluation-
functions which are formal-axiological meanings 
of the parts of the compound word-combinations 
under consideration. (Here the terms “function” 
and “composition of functions” are used in 
their proper mathematical meanings as well.) 
It is easy to see that in the language L2 the 
linguistic principle of semantic compositionality 
of meanings of compound word-combinations 
is a very specific one. Let this specific formal-
axiological compositionality-principle be called 
C-P2. Hence, respectively, the linguistic principle 
of semantic compositionality of meanings of 
compound word-combinations in the language 
L1 is to be called C-P1. The functions and 
compositions of functions implied by the two 
compositionality principles (C-P1 and C-P2), 
are significantly different ones. How does the 
principle C-P2 work? For showing a concrete 
example of its functioning let us consider the 
epistemic paradox of George Moore [1; 2; 5; 6; 
8; 14]. To do this we need some additional moral-
evaluation-functions to be introduced and defined 
by the below glossaries and tables. 
The glossary for the Table 4: The symbol 
K2xy stands for the binary moral-evaluation-
function “uniting (conjoining) x and y in a 
conduct as a whole”. (Here the index 2 indicates 
that the indexed letter stands for a binary 
operation.) T2xy – the moral-evaluation-function 
“destruction, termination, annihilation of x by 
y”. P2xy – the evaluation-function “preservation, 
conservation of x by y”. O2xy – “y’s offensive, 
assault (aggression), attack against x”. D2xy – 
“defense of x by y”. V2xy – “y’s violence over 
(what, whom) x”. J2xy – “y’s nonviolence over 
(what, whom) x”. U2xy – “excluding moral choice 
of the best between x and y (combined with 
realization of the chosen and non-realization of 
the not-chosen)”. A2xy – “not-excluding moral 
choice (and realization) of the best among such 
moral alternatives which can be made by means 
of x and y”. W2xy – “uniting (conjoining) non-
realization of x and non-realization of y (in a 
conduct as a whole)”. E2xy – “moral identification 
of x and y”, or “morally equalizing x and y”. 
C2xy – “realizing y in response to realization 
of x”. X2xy – “y’s contradiction to (what, whom) 
x”. 
The glossary for the table 5: The symbol Nx 
stands for the unary moral-evaluation-function 
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“nonbeing (nonexistence) of x”. Bx – the moral-
evaluation-function “being (existence) of x”. Gx – 
“God of x”. Fx – “faith in x”. Lx – “alethic necessity 
of x”. Mx – “alethic possibility of x”. Yx – “alethic 
accidentalness (contingency) of x”. Ox – “making 
(what) x obligatory”, or “x’s being obligatory”. 
Px – “permitting (what) x”, or “x’s being permitted, 
or “permission of x”. Ix – “deontic indifference to 
x”. Zx – “alethic tolerance to x”. Sx – “x’s self-
destruction, self-termination (suicide)”. Cx – “x’s 
self-preservation, self-conservation”. Jx – “x’s 
self-salvation”. Dx – “x’s self-defense”. Wx – “x’s 
moral self-contradiction”, or “inconsistency in 
moral form of x’s activity”. 
Using the above-given definitions one can 
substantiate the following equation of two-valued 
algebra of formal ethics. 
8) K2KExyNBFxy=+=b.
According to the above definitions DF-2 
and DF-3, this formal-ethical equation means 
that the epistemic paradox of George Moore 
is a formal-ethical contradiction, i.e. an 
inconsistency in moral form of x’s activity [14]. 
This conclusion is very interesting and important 
one in a wide philosophical context, but in the 
present paper I concentrate attention mainly on the 
fact that computing the equation (8) necessarily 
exploits the above-discussed principle of 
compositionality of formal-axiological meanings 
(C-P2). 
Moreover demonstrations of the following 
formal-ethical equations also imply using the 
formal-axiological compositionality principle 
(C-P2). 
9) C2NGxPy=+=g: if God does not 
exist then everything is permitted (F. 
Dostoyevsky).
10) C2PSxPy=+=g: if suicide is permitted 
then everything is permitted (L. 
Wittgenstein [23]).
11) C2NPdNPSx=+=g: if some (action) 
d is not permitted, then suicide is not 
permitted (L. Wittgenstein [23]).
The discrete mathematical models (of moral 
and metaphysical principles) considered in this 
paper are interesting not only from an abstract 
philosophical theory viewpoint, but also from 
the ones of theology and philosophy of religion, 
ethics (philosophy of morals), legal philosophy 
of the natural law, criminology (philosophy 
of crime), psychology, and even psychiatry. 
Important practical work aimed at prevention 
Table 4: Binary moral operations in two-valued algebra of formal ethics 
x y K2xy T2xy P2xy O2xy D2xy V2xy J2xy U 2xy A2xy W2xy E2xy C2xy X2xy
g g g b g b g b g b g b g g b
g b b b g b g b g g g b b b b
b g b g b g b g b g g b b g g
b b b b g b g b g b b g g g b
 Table 5: Unary moral operations in two-valued algebra of formal ethics 
x Nx Bx Gx Fx Lx Mx Yx Ox Px Ix Zx Sx Cx Jx Dx Wx
g b g g g g g b g g b b b g g g b
b g b g b b b b b b b b b g g g b
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of committing suicides unites all the mentioned 
disciplines in one activity and necessarily links 
them with the abstract fundamental investigation 
undertaken in this paper. 
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Два мира, два языка, две семантики,  
два лингвистических принципа композиционности  
и два вида бессмыслицы  
(Критика философии Винтгенштейна  
о морали и метафизике  
с использованием дискретного  
математического моделирования  
формально-этического аспекта его точки зрения) 
В.О. Лобовиков
Институт философии и права 
Россия, 620990, Екатеринбург, ул.Софьи Ковалевской, 16
В статье представлена систематическая критика точки зрения Винтгенштейна о 
семантике естественного языка этики и метафизики. Критика основана на дискретном 
математическом моделировании известного принципа разделения фактов и ценностей. 
Для точного математического формулирования данного принципа разделения 
используется двузначная алгебра формальной этики. Используя принцип разделения 
факта и ценности, автор предлагает систематическое разделение двух миров, двух 
противоположных аспектов естественных языков, двух формальных семантик, двух 
типов значений, двух различных принципов лингвистической композиционности значений 
и двух видов бессмыслицы. Парные миры, парные аспекты естественных языков, парные 
формальные семантики, парные типы значений и парные виды бессмыслицы являются 
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взаимоисключающими и взаимодополняющими. Первые схожие элементы относятся к 
миру «Трактата». Вторые схожие элементы относятся к миру чистых значений, мир 
которых трансцендентен по отношению к миру «Трактата». Целью данной работы 
является толкование и точное табличное определение формально-аксиологических 
значений слов и составных словосочетаний естественного языка морали и метафизики. 
Автор отмечает, что в соответствии с представленным (новым) формально-
аксиологическим принципом лингвистической композиционности (значений), формально-
аксиологическим значением составного словосочетания (естественного языка морали и 
метафизики) выступает состав морально-оценочных функций, являющихся формально-
аксиологическими значениями составных частей словосочетания. Идея вычисления 
формально-аксиологических смыслов составных словосочетаний (языка морали и 
метафизики) иллюстрируется представленным дискурсом соответствующих знаний, 
алетической веры и алетической толерантности. В алгебраической системе формальной 
этики дано точное определение соотношения формально-этической эквивалентности 
между морально-оценочными функциями. Формально-этические уравнения создаются 
посредством вычисления соответствующих морально-оценочных таблиц. В качестве 
иллюстрирующих примеров приводятся уравнения, связывающие морально-оценочные 
функции «знания», «допущения», «веры» и «сомнения».
Ключевые слова: мир, язык, формальный, логика, этика, алгебра формальной этики, 
семантика, лингвистический принцип композиционности, морально-оценочная функция, 
аксиологический, значение, бессмыслица.
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